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“Designing Danger”: Complex Engineering by Violent NonState Actors: Introduction to the Special Issue
Abstract
This Special Issue of the Journal of Strategic Security (JSS) presents the results of a series
of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to engage in complex engineering tasks, in the
hope of informing strategic assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging
technologies.
One particular concern in international security lies at the nexus of violent non-state actors
(VNSAs) and sophisticated technologies. When it comes to the assessment of such threats,
much of the analysis hinges upon being able to accurately judge the desire and capability
of adversaries to successfully carry out complex engineering operations. Yet, the actual
process of how and why VNSAs engage in these efforts and the determinants of their
success or failure are understudied aspects, at least in terms of systematic comparison
across actors, technologies and time periods. This special issue presents the results of a
series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to engage in complex engineering tasks, in
the hope of informing strategic assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging
technologies. The introductory article defines a complex engineering effort, summarizes
the existing literature on the topic and sets out the methodology and framing questions
used in the case studies.
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Introduction
Among the many global dynamics rising to the fore in the 21st century, two of
the most prominent are the growth in the systemic influence of terrorists and
other violent non-state actors (VNSAs), and the advent of a range of
transformational technologies. In the context of international security, there
is particular concern with respect to the nexus of these two forces, where it is
feared that VNSAs might adopt emerging technologies, such as synthetic
biology or quantum computing, to magnify the threat that they pose.
On the one hand, it is tempting to inflate the threat, painting VNSAs as
Bondian-supervillians capable of casually constructing doomsday weapons,
while ignoring the multiple hurdles inherent in such enterprises and the
empirical fact that in the past most VNSAs most of the time have shown
themselves to be conservative and imitative rather than innovative in their
tactics and weapons.1 On the other hand, it may be even more hazardous to
assume that VNSAs will never be able to successfully adopt new technologies,
when there exist several historical examples of VNSAs doing just that.
While a large part of the security concern lies in the fact that many emerging
technologies render it easier, safer and less costly for non-experts to adopt
new weapons and tactics,2 for several prominent threats—especially those
stemming from the potential VNSA use of so-called “weapons of mass
destruction”—the process of adoption and deployment as a whole still
requires a complex application of knowledge and materials in a practical
context. Thus, when it comes to the assessment of such threats, much of the
analysis hinges upon being able to accurately judge the desire and capability
of adversaries to successfully carry out complex engineering operations.
Yet, the actual process of how and why VNSAs engage in these efforts and the
determinants of their success or failure are understudied aspects, at least in
terms of systematic comparison across actors, technologies and time periods.
A team of researchers at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
Jenkins, Brian, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101,
Reflections on Providing for “The Common Good,” 101:5 (1986), 777-778; Hoffman,
Bruce, Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities (Santa Monica,
California: RAND, 1992), 15; Dolnik, Adam, Understanding Terrorist Innovation:
Technology, tactics and global trends (New York: Routledge, 2007), 56.
2 Ackerman, Gary, “‘More Bang for the Buck’: Examining the Determinants of Terrorist
Adoption of New Weapons Technologies” (PhD Dissertation: King’s College London,
2014), 23, available at:
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/32901277/2014_Ackerman_Gary_0715371_ethes
is.pdf.
1
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and Responses to Terrorism (START) therefore came together with the
objective of deriving insights regarding the dynamics and outcomes of
complex engineering efforts undertaken by VNSAs. This special issue
presents the results of a series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to
engage in complex engineering tasks, in the hope of informing strategic
assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define a complex engineering effort, as
undertaken by a VNSA. Thus, for the purposes of this volume, a complex
engineering effort by a VNSA is one that involves:


Multiple components (sub-tasks) of different types (e.g., mechanical,
chemical, machining) that must integrate properly in order for the
effort to succeed;



The manpower of more than just one person;3



A variety of technical skills (such as chemical synthesis, welding, or
electronics); and



A more sophisticated effort than standard operations for the context
(time and place) in which the VNSA is operating.

Framing the Study4
There has been almost no discussion in the terrorism,5 insurgency or
organized crime literatures that is specifically directed towards complex
Complexity usually implies an interaction of multiple parts and, since we are focused
here on VNSA organizations rather than lone actors, we restrict the definition of a
complex engineering effort to one involving multiple people. It is partly the very
requirement for different individuals within an organization to cooperate and integrate
their activities in order to achieve a common goal that makes a particular task “complex”
in this sense. Therefore, no matter how ingenious and versatile a particular single
member is, their individual efforts, at least in the current instance, can be complicated,
but not complex.
4 The author would like to acknowledge the efforts of Daniel Smith, James Halverson,
Molly MacCalman and Michelle Jacome in assisting him in assembling a broad literature
review from which this section is drawn.
5 Without wanting to enter the definitional fray surrounding terrorism, in this issue the
term is used in the sense of “The intentional use or threatened use of violence by an
ideologically motivated non-state actor in a manner that would be regarded in wartime as
contravening international humanitarian law and that is directed against victims selected
for their symbolic or representative value, as a means of instilling anxiety in, transmitting
one or more messages to, and thereby manipulating the attitudes and behavior of a wider
target audience or audiences”—based on the definition espoused by Jeffrey Bale. See Gary
Ackerman, et. al., Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure,
3
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engineering efforts by VNSAs, as here defined. However, there is a fair
amount of material on both related superordinate and subordinate topics. In
a broader sense, a complex engineering effort in the VNSA context will almost
always represent a qualitative departure from the status quo operating
posture for a particular VNSA, since it is rare (except perhaps in the case of
sophisticated IEDs for some rebel groups in places like Iraq) for a VNSA to
have “industrialized” its logistical or weapons acquisition systems to the
extent that complex efforts become merely incremental changes to a longstanding standard operating procedure. Therefore, complex engineering
efforts can usually be situated within the wider topic of VNSA innovation,
about which there is a growing literature.6 Nonetheless, only a subset of
VNSA innovations will qualify as complex engineering efforts. Therefore, the
extent to which more general findings about VNSA learning and innovation
apply to the specific situation of complex engineering efforts, or whether
additional dynamics might characterize these efforts, is still an open question.
Similarly, one subset of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs—the potential
for them to produce their own high-level chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear (CBRN) weapons—has been extensively discussed,7 especially in the
case of improvised nuclear devices.8 Yet, this literature has largely focused on

Report for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the Department of Homeland
Security (Monterey, California: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004),
available at https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/341566.pdf, 10 January 2010, p. 15 (ftn 51).
6 Ranstorp, Magnus and Magnus Normark (eds.), Understanding Terrorism Innovation
and Learning: Al-Qaeda and Beyond, (New York: Routledge, 2015); Dolnik,
Understanding Terrorist Innovation; Rasmussen, Maria J. and Mohamed Hafez (eds.)
Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive
Indicators (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office,
Report Number ASCO 2010-019, 2010), 18, available at:
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=9908; Jackson, Brian A. et al., Aptitude for
Destruction-Vol. 1. Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications
for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007); Gill, Paul, John Horgan, Samuel
T. Hunter and Lily D. Cushenbery, “Malevolent creativity in terrorist organizations”,
Journal of Creative Behavior 47:2 (2013), 125-151; and Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to
Osama (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2008).
7 See, for example: Waller, Jr., Forest E. and Michael A. George, “Emerging WMD
Technologies,” in Russell D. Howard and James J.F. Forest (eds.), Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Terrorism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 499-511; Bunn, Matthew,
“Guardians at the Gates of Hell” (PhD dissertation: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2007); Koblentz, Gregory D., Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and
International Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); and Smithson, Amy E.,
“Indicators of Chemical Terrorism” in Ranstorp and Normark (eds.), Unconventional
Weapons and International Terrorism, 67-94.
8 Ferguson, Charles D. and William Potter, et. al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism
(New York: Routledge, 2005); Levi, Michael, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2007); and Jenkins, Brian Michael, Will Terrorists Go
Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008).
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the narrow technical requirements of the specific weapon type under
consideration, with little reference to whether these requirements extend to
the topic of complex engineering efforts outside the CBRN realm or to novel,
emerging technologies. The decision making and requirements surrounding
the construction of as unique a weapon as an improvised nuclear device might
very well be sui generis and less applicable to other complex engineering
efforts.
Therefore, while existing scholarship can provide a guide for understanding
complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, there is still a gap in the
understanding of exactly which of the many factors and dynamics identified
in the literature on VNSA innovation and WMD development apply in the
case of complex engineering efforts, how strongly they act on the process, and
whether there are certain factors that become especially salient in the context
of complex engineering efforts.
In order to inform our exploration of the topic, we drew on the existing
literature described above as a source of insights that might be relevant to
investigating VNSA complex engineering efforts, focusing on those that seem
most appropriate to the current topic. It should be noted that this is a
preliminary investigation and we are not at this stage laying out or formally
testing hypotheses. Rather, we seek to identify potentially salient factors and
dynamics that can be formally validated by further research. Among the key
theories and findings from the broader literature that guided our examination
of VNSA complex engineering efforts were the following:
1. The process of decision making surrounding VNSA technology
adoption is equifinite. In other words, there is no single (and not
necessarily even a predominant) causal path to deciding to adopt, say,
a new weapon.9
2. Major identified drivers of VNSA innovation in general and the pursuit
of WMD in particular include: countermeasures imposed by
opponents;10 desensitization of the target public or the intended
constituency;11 a desire for greater status either within the VNSA,

Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck’, 219.
Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation, 153; Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 252, Jackson, et al., Aptitude for
Destruction, 19.
11 Schmid, Alex P. and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism
and the Western News Media (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), 172.
9

10
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relative to other VNSAs, or as an actor on the world stage;12 and an
ideological or psychological need on the part of leaders to engage in
technologically sophisticated operations (sometimes referred to as
“techno-fetishism”).13
3. The decision to innovate and/or the process itself can be facilitated by:
champions either within or outside the VNSA,14 demonstration of the
technology by15 and collaboration16 with other VNSAs (especially those
within the same social network); a willingness to learn and
experiment;17 and an overall organizational tolerance for taking risks.18
4. Having a separate, institutionalized “engineering” or R&D organ
within the organization19 and a safe haven20 are important factors in
both a positive decision to innovate and the ultimate success of
innovation adoption attempts. Conversely, intra-organizational
discord21 and pressures from security forces can impede adoption
efforts.22
5. Some technology development efforts can take on their own
momentum within an organization, as vested interests for the effort
develop.23

Ferguson, Charles D. and William C. Potter, Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear
Terrorism (Stockholm, Sweden: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006), 6.
13 Jeffrey M. Bale and Gary A. Ackerman, “Profiling the WMD Terrorist Threat” in
Stephen M. Maurer (ed.), WMD Terrorism: Science and Policy Choices (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2009); Ronfeldt, David and William Sater. The Mindsets of High-Technology
Terrorists: Future Implications from an Historical Analog (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
1981), 15, 27; Jackson, Brian A., “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat
Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption,” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 24:3 (2001), 193; Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations
in Weapons of Mass Effect, 18.
14 Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck,” 52, 93.
15 Ibid., 106.
16 Hargadon, Andrew. 2003. How Breakthroughs Happen: The Surprising Truth about
How Companies Innovate (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2003), ix, 60.
17 Jackson, Aptitude for Destruction, 46; Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in
Weapons of Mass Effect, 3.
18 Jackson et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 46; Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist
Innovation, 167.
19 Jackson et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 46; Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck’, 240.
20 Jackson, et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 43.
21 Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck’, 150.
22 Jackson, et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 57.
23 MacKenzie, Donald, Essays on Technical Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 58.
12
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6. With respect to obtaining the requisite expertise for innovation, the
literature suggests that VNSAs do not necessarily require members
with outstanding technical expertise, but instead a membership that is
stable, proficient in analyzing existing methods and resources, and can
reconfigure these to meet an organization’s goals.24
7. While VNSAs may vary considerably with respect to the value they
place on the safety and security of members involved in innovation
efforts, key members with technical skills and experience will generally
be protected, as their loss can severely diminish a group’s
capabilities.25
One feature of existing scholarship is copious discussion of the different
pathways by which VNSAs could acquire a WMD capability, such as by theft,
transfer from a patron, or purchase on a putative black market. However, in
the current context of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, by definition we
presume that the bulk of the adoption process consists of internal
development activities carried out by group members, with perhaps only raw
materials or equipment being procured through other means. Furthermore,
the existing literature says relatively little about the process by which a
complex engineering task is implemented, other than to prescribe acquiring
the necessary knowledge and skills, ensuring adequate funding, equipment
and materials, and establishing a development site. There was therefore
particular emphasis placed in the current study on the implementation
aspects of complex engineering efforts.
The collective insights extracted from related literatures thus led the research
team to adopt the following framing questions to shape its exploration of
complex engineering efforts by VNSAs:


What drives VNSAs to undertake complex engineering tasks?



Who makes decisions and what is the role of risk perceptions?



How is the relevant expertise required?



How are the security and safety of the effort ensured?

Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, 2; Jackson,
et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 48.
25 Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups”, 194.
24
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How are obstacles dealt with?



Why do these attempts either succeed or fail?

Methodology
Given that there is little to no prior research on complex engineering efforts
by VNSAs, it is appropriate to examine the topic in an exploratory fashion.26
This approach places less emphasis on controlling for certain variables or
comparing both positive and negative cases, as would be necessary if the
objective was to test an existing theory. Therefore, in order to gain from our
preliminary analysis as much direction as possible regarding where to steer
future research, we focused on those cases where complex engineering tasks
had at least been attempted, leaving more complicated comparative analyses27
to later studies. Similarly, we sought to gain as much variety in temporal,
geographic and cultural context between cases as possible, in order to more
easily and accurately identify organizational factors fundamentally associated
with the decision to engage in complex engineering tasks and the successful
completion of such tasks.
To select cases, we therefore sought instances that met the following criteria:
a) the activity undertaken by the VNSA must qualify as a complex engineering
effort, as defined above; b) cases that showed variety in terms of the context
in which they occurred and the activity engaged in; and c) for practical
purposes, cases for which sufficient data existed in the open sources to allow
for a detailed description of the dynamics involved. An initial survey of
available literature and databases yielded 22 candidate cases, as listed
chronologically in Table 1.1.

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 20-22, 45
27 These include controlled comparison, congruence procedures and process tracing – see
Van Evera, Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1997), 56-67.
26
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Table 1.1 Complex Engineering by VNSAs – Candidate Cases
Candidate Case
(VNSA –
Engineering Effort)
ETA (Basque separatists)
– Remote-controlled Car
Anarchists –
Dynamite Weapons
Ahmed Jibril (Popular
Front for the Liberation
of Palestine) –
Barometric Pressure
Bombs
Provisional IRA –
Mortar system
Rajneeshees –
Biological Weapons
LTTE (Tamil Tigers) –
Fast Attack boats
Aum Shinrikyo –
Biological Weapons
Aum Shinrikyo –
Nuclear Weapons
Aum Shinrikyo –
Chemical Weapons
Ramzi Yousef –
Sophisticated Liquid
Explosive Devices
Al-Qaida –
Chem / Bio Weapons
Al-Qaida –
Nuclear Weapons

Extent
to
which
CEE

Outcome28

Adversary Time
Data
Region
Type
Period
Availability

4

Apocryphal

Terrorist

2

Success

Terrorist

1880sEurope
1900s

Yes

3

Success

Terrorist

1960s1970s

Middle
East;
Europe

Yes

4

Success

Terrorist

1970s1990s

Europe

Yes

2

Success

Terrorist /
Cult

1980s

N.
America

Yes

3

Success

Terrorist

1980s2000s

Asia

Yes

5

Failure

1990s

Asia

Yes

5

Failure

1990s

Asia

Yes

4

Success

1990s

Asia

Yes

3

Success

Terrorist

2

Failure

Terrorist

5

Failure

Terrorist

FARC – Submersibles

5

Success

Terrorist /
TCO29

Hamas – Tunnels

4

Success

Terrorist

4

Success

Terrorist

4

Success

Terrorist

3

Success

Terrorist

2000s

Middle
East

Yes

3

Success

Terrorist

2000s

Middle
East

Yes

2

Failure

Terrorist

2000s

Middle
East

No

Hezbollah –
Guidance System
Hezbollah – Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles
AL-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula –
Printer Cartridge Bomb
AL-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula –
Underwear Bomb
Hamas – Cyanide

Terrorist /
Cult
Terrorist /
Cult
Terrorist /
Cult

N/A

Europe

N.
America;
Asia
1990s- Middle
2000s East; Asia
1990s- Middle
2000s East; Asia
1990s- South
Present America
Middle
2000s
East
Middle
2000s
East
Middle
2000s
East
1990s

N/A

Partial
Yes
Partial
Yes
Yes
No
No

Success denotes cases where the engineering effort yielded functional and at least
partially efficacious results, failure denotes cases that did not, and apocryphal refers to
cases that are mentioned in the open sources but there is no credible evidence that they
ever actually occurred.
29 TCO = Transnational Criminal Organization.
28
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Zetas – Radio Network

4

Success

TCO

Hamas – UAVs

4

Success

Terrorist

Syrian Rebels –
“Drive by wire” Machine
Gun Vehicle

3

Undetermined Insurgent

2000s- N.
Present America
Middle
2010s
East
2010s

Middle
East

Yes
No
No

Upon further research, one case (ETA’s production of a remote-controlled
vehicle) was quickly excluded because it was likely apocryphal and based on a
mistranslation of news reports. Any candidate for which there was not a high
degree of confidence of sufficiently detailed information being available in the
open sources was also dropped from consideration. The remaining cases
were prioritized in terms of the degree to which they met the definition of a
complex engineering effort provided above, judged subjectively on a 1 to 5
scale. This was measured against the complexity of the task that was
attempted, irrespective of the extent to which the actor succeeded. Thus,
Aum Shinrikyo’s attempts to produce a nuclear weapon, even though these
never progressed beyond the embryonic stage, receive the highest rating given
the inherent complexity of actually constructing an improvised nuclear
device.
Also, for tasks where the complexity varies across subcategories of weapon or
technology pursued, the rating is based on the specific type actually pursued
by the VNSA. So, for example, since al-Qaida and Hamas only pursued
relatively primitive chemical agents (such as cyanide), their efforts receive a
lower rating than the chemical weapons exploits of Aum Shinrikyo, which
pursued more sophisticated agents like sarin and VX. Similarly, while
submersibles can range across multiple levels of complexity, those pursued by
FARC, which included integrated and advanced propulsion, navigation and
life support systems, receive a higher rating.30 In order to explore the most
clear-cut instances of complex engineering efforts, it was decided to only
consider cases scoring 4 or 5. This left the cases in the highlighted rows in
Table 1.1.31
Since the scale only goes up to 5, both the efforts of FARC and Aum’s nuclear efforts
receive the maximum value, even though nuclear weapons are arguably somewhat more
complex to construct than submersibles.
31 While Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons program also met the criteria, this program
has been extensively detailed elsewhere (for example, see Richard, Danzig, Marc
Sageman, et. al., Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and
Chemical Weapons (2nd Edition) (Center for a New American Security, 2012), available
at:
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_SecondEdit
ion_English.pdf, making a detailed case study less useful. Therefore, researchers
30
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The cases selected for this study were therefore:
1. The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the development of
advanced mortar systems.
2. Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs (combined
into a single case).
3. The production of submersibles and submarines by FARC (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).
4. The Los Zetas transnational criminal organizations’ construction and
maintenance of an expansive radio communication network across
Mexico.
5. Hamas and the construction of attack tunnel networks from Gaza into
Israel.
These five cases span six different types of engineering activity, three types of
organization (terrorist, criminal and hybrid), four regions, and each decade
from the 1970s to the present, thus providing ample variety in terms of
context. While researching possible cases, researchers also noted the
importance of the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology smuggling network.
Although not itself qualifying as a complex engineering effort, the evolution
and activities of this network provide a stark illustration of one avenue by
which violent non-state actors might gain access to the sophisticated
technology and expertise required for a particular complex engineering effort.
It was therefore decided to conduct a sixth case study on the A.Q. Khan saga,
which, although differing from the other five, demonstrates how illicit
networks might facilitate a violent non-state actor’s complex engineering
efforts.
The research team then assigned one or more authors to each case, based on
prior expertise and interest. This was followed by the data collection phase,
which comprised extensive research of the open sources, including books,
journal articles, government reports and news reports. This was
supplemented in several cases by interviews with experts having intimate

regarded it as sufficient to focus on the cult’s chemical and nuclear programs, the former
effort regarded as at least a qualified engineering success and the latter an abject failure.
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knowledge of the particular case or VNSA. Collected sources were then
evaluated for relevance, reliability, and corroboration or contradiction. With
respect to the actual construction of the case studies, all authors were
instructed to attempt to answer the framing questions listed above and to
structure their analysis according to a standardized format. This consisted of
four main sections, each of which was designed to broach a number of subtopics as far as available information allowed. Each case was therefore
structured as follows:32
1. An introductory section providing background and a summary of the
type of complex engineering effort undertaken by the VNSA.
2. A section on the decision to engage in the complex engineering effort,
encompassing, where possible, the motivation behind the effort, the
decision makers involved, the degree of risk tolerated by the VNSA and
the length of the planning and development cycle.
3. A section on the implementation aspects of the effort, including not
only a discussion of the process followed, but also descriptions of the
implementing parties, sources of technical expertise, any collaboration
with external parties, safety and security considerations, and obstacles
that were encountered throughout the process.
4. A concluding section, providing an analysis both of why the VNSA was
drawn to pursuing the particular complex engineering task and the
factors that were ultimately responsible for the success (or otherwise)
of its efforts.
The six case studies, together with their individual findings, are presented in
the remainder this special issue. The first five cases follow the structured
format shown above, while the A.Q. Khan case highlights the establishment
and ultimate break-up of the nuclear smuggling network. Upon completion of
the case studies, it became possible to synthesize and compare the complex
engineering efforts undertaken by the VNSAs, a task carried out in the
concluding article of this issue.

The A.Q. Khan case, being qualitatively different from the rest, followed a somewhat
different structure, focusing on the evolution of the network and why it persisted for so
long, as well as why it was ultimately interdicted.
32
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